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Abstract—It is well-known that Android malware constantly
evolves so as to evade detection. This causes the entire malware
population to be non-stationary. Contrary to this fact, most of
the prior works on Machine Learning based Android malware
detection have assumed that the distribution of the observed
malware characteristics (i.e., features) does not change over time.
In this work, we address the problem of malware population
drift and propose a novel online learning based framework to
detect malware, named CASANDRA (Context-aware, Adaptive
and Scalable ANDRoid mAlware detector). In order to perform
accurate detection, a novel graph kernel that facilitates captur-
ing apps’ security-sensitive behaviors along with their context
information from dependency graphs is proposed. Besides being
accurate and scalable, CASANDRA has specific advantages: (i)
being adaptive to the evolution in malware features over time
(ii) explaining the significant features that led to an app’s classi-
fication as being malicious or benign. In a large-scale comparative
analysis, CASANDRA outperforms two state-of-the-art techniques
on a benchmark dataset achieving 99.23% F-measure. When
evaluated with more than 87,000 apps collected in-the-wild,
CASANDRA achieves 89.92% accuracy, outperforming existing
techniques by more than 25% in their typical batch learning
setting and more than 7% when they are continuously retained,
while maintaining comparable efficiency.
Index Terms—Online Learning, Graph Kernels, Malware De-
tection, Concept Drift.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent times, malware detection for mobile platformssuch as Android has evolved as one of the challenging
problems in the field of cyber-security. The number of new An-
droid malware applications (apps) have grown tremendously
in recent years. For instance, Symantec reports [1] discovering
430 million new malware in 2015 which is a 36% increase over
2014. Also their capabilities have grown from simple phone
cloning, sending premium-rated SMS to complex botnets,
cryptolocker and ransomware [29]–[32]. Besides this, attackers
continuously enhance the sophistication of malware to evade
novel detection techniques. The sheer volume, growth rate
and evolution of sophisticated Android malware highlights an
imperative need for developing sound and scalable automated
malware detection techniques [12, 13, 29, 31, 32].
Machine Learning based malware detection. For over
a decade, Machine Learning (ML) techniques have been
predominantly used to perform malware detection in various
platforms (such as Windows and Android) [12]–[17, 21, 29]–
[32, 39, 50]. This is because, ML methods automatically learn
the characteristics that distinguish malicious behavior, when
trained using a collection of malware and benign samples
making them amenable for automated detection. ML based
approaches extract semantic features from apps’ behaviors
and apply standard classification algorithms (e.g., Support
Vector Machine (SVM), Random Forests (RFs), etc.) to per-
form binary classification. These approaches typically use fea-
tures such as system calls/Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs) invoked, resources and privileges used, control- and
data-flows inside apps’ execution to detect malicious behavior
patterns [13, 14, 16, 17, 21, 39]. These semantic features are
extracted through static [12]–[15, 17, 39] and dynamic [29, 40]
program analysis.
A. Malware detection using graph representations
Malware variants. A major reason for the tremendous
growth rate in malware is the production of malware variants.
Typically, the attackers produce large number of variants of
the same malware by resorting to techniques such as variable
renaming and junk code insertion [32, 39, 41]. These variants
perform same malicious functionality, with apparently dif-
ferent syntax, thus evading syntax-based detectors. However,
higher level semantic representations such as call graphs,
control- and data-flow graphs, control-, data- and program-
dependency graphs mostly stay similar even when the code is
considerably altered [13]–[17]. In this work, we use a common
term, Program Representation Graph (PRG) to refer to any
of the aforementioned graphs. As PRGs are resilient against
variants, many works in the past have used them to perform
malware detection. In essence, such works cast malware
detection as a graph classification problem and apply existing
graph mining and classification techniques [14, 15, 17, 41].
Some methods such as [17, 21, 41] note that ML classifiers are
readily applicable on data represented as vectors and attempt
to encode PRGs as feature vectors.
Graph Mining and Kernels. Many existing works such
as [19] and [20] use off-the-shelf graph mining algorithms on
PRGs for malware detection. However, it has to be noted that
the scale of malware detection problem is such that we have
millions of samples already and thousands streaming in every
day. Many classic graph mining based approaches (e.g., [41])
are NP hard and have severe scalability issues, making them
impractical for real-world malware detection.
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On the other hand, one of the increasingly popular ap-
proaches in ML for graph-structured data is the use of graph
kernels. These graph kernels could be used together with a
kernel classifier (e.g., SVM) to perform graph classification
[59]. Recently, efficient and expressive graph kernels such as
[59], [60] and [61] have been proposed and widely adopted
in many application domains (e.g, computer vision [63],
chemoinformatics [62], etc.). These kernels have been known
to operate in linear-time and have produced accurate results
in many real-world applications. Therefore, it just suffices
to apply any of these kernels on suitable PRGs and we
have an effective, scalable and ready-to-use malware detector.
However, as we explain later, these general purpose graph
kernels do not take many problem-specific constraints and
hence yield suboptimal accuracies.
B. Challenges in ML based malware detection
Almost all ML based Android malware detection techniques
(incl. the aforementioned ones) operate in a batch-learning
setting and use off-the-shelf batch learners like SVM or RFs.
Meaning, the detection model is built using a batch of labeled
benign and malware samples and is subsequently used to
predict whether a given new sample is benign or malicious.
In general, these ML based approaches are typically plagued
by four challenges that make them unsuitable for large-scale
real-world malware detection:
(C1) Population drift. Though batch-learning based solu-
tions are promising, their success is predicated on an important
assumption that may not hold for the malware detection
problem. Meaning, they assume that the malware population
(i.e., training data) used to build the detection model does not
change over time. However, malware does not fit this profile.
The entire population of malware is constantly evolving due
to various reasons such as exploiting new vulnerabilities
and evading novel detection techniques. This evolution has
a profound impact on malware characteristics and thereby
on the features used by these ML models. This makes the
collection of malware identified today unrepresentative of the
ones generated in the future. This phenomenon is an epitome
of population drift [31, 50].
(C2) Volume. Since the malware population grows at an
alarming rate, a scalable classifier is of paramount importance
for real-world malware detection. In order to keep abreast
with drifting population, batch learners have to be frequently
retrained with huge volumes of data. Hence they pose severe
scalability issues when used in the Android malware detection
context where we have thousands of apps streaming in every
day. Retraining frequently with such a volume renders them
computationally impractical.
(C3) Explainability. In general, these ML based solutions
just predict the labels of a given sample without offering
insights or explanations into how those predictions are ar-
rived at. In other words, they act as black-box solutions.
However, for malware detection models, understanding the
reasons behind their predictions is important in assessing their
trustworthiness. This is fundamental if one plans to take action
such as deploying a new model or studying malware evolution
based on these predictions.
(C4) Expressiveness. PRGs are known to be complex
and expressive data structures that characterize topological
relationships among program entities. Representing them as
vectors or other formats amenable for applying ML algorithms
is a non-trivial task [41]. In many cases such representations
fail to capture all the vital information from PRGs, thus loos-
ing their expressiveness. For instance, solutions like [16], [17]
and [18] capture the topological neighborhood (i.e., structural)
information from PRGs and detect security-sensitive behaviors
through analyzing them. However, as revealed by recent works
such as [14] and [15], an important contextual factor that
distinguishes malice is whether or not the user is aware of
such behaviors. Unfortunately, the above-mentioned methods
which capture structural information well, fail to capture the
contextual information and this leads to raising false alarms
even when sensitive operations are performed with users’
consent. The general purpose graph kernels such as [55]–[61]
also suffer with the same drawback.
In summary, challenges C1, C2 and C3 impair all ML based
approaches and C4 deters graph based learning approaches.
C. Our Approach
We take these four challenges into consideration and
propose CASANDRA(Context-aware, Adaptive and Scalable
ANDRoid mAlware detection) framework based on online
learning, where we continuously retrain the model upon re-
ceiving each labeled sample and make prediction of a new
sample using the updated model. CASANDRA is developed
with the four following design goals:
1. Accuracy. Accuracy of CASANDRA, which is a PRG based
approach depends on how well it retains PRG’s expressiveness.
In other words, it depends on how well the approach addresses
challenge C4. To this end, we leverage on our previous
work [10] and use the Contextual Weisfeiler-Lehman kernel
(CWLK) that is specifically designed to capture both structural
and contextual information from PRGs.
2. Efficiency. CASANDRA achieves its efficiency through the
combined use of a scalable graph kernel (i.e., CWLK) and a
state-of-the-art online classifier, namely, Confidence Weighted
(CW) algorithm [47]. This addresses challenge C2.
3. Adaptiveness. CASANDRA automatically adapts to malware
population drift through its use of online classifier and thus
addressing challenge C1.
4. Explainability. Since CASANDRA uses a linear classifier
along with CWLK which permits explicit feature vector rep-
resentation of PRGs, we are able to categorically identify
the PRG subgraph features which contribute to its predic-
tions. This makes CASANDRA’s predictions explainable thus
addressing challenge C3.
Experiments. CASANDRA is evaluated through large-scale
experiments both on benchmark and a recent real-world dataset
of more than 87,000 apps. CASANDRA achieves 89.92%
accuracy on the real-world dataset, outperforming two state-
of-the-art techniques by more than 25% in their typical batch-
learning setting and more than 7% when they are continuously
retrained, while maintaining comparable efficiency. Through
further experiments, we demonstrate CASANDRA’s explain-
able detection process and its adaptiveness.
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Contributions. On one hand, in our recent work [10],
we developed CWLK, a graph kernel that is specifically
designed to perform malware detection using PRGs1. CWLK
captures both contextual and structural information, enabling
it to achieve high accuracy in a batch learning setting. On
the other hand, another recent work of ours, DroidOL [11],
demonstrated that online learning based solutions are better
suited for large-scale real-world automated malware detec-
tion than batch learning methods. However, DroidOL used
a general purpose kernel which can only capture structural
information from PRGs. In this work, we bring together the
best of both the worlds. More specifically, we combine a kernel
which is specifically designed to cater the malware detection
task (i.e., CWLK), with a learning paradigm that suits the
task extremely well (i.e.,online learning). To the best of our
knowledge CASANDRA is the first framework that leverages
on both task-specific kernel and online learning to perform
malware detection. Besides this, we have made the three
following new contributions in CASANDRA:
• Performing explainable malware detection is an unique
feature of CASANDRA. As we demonstrate through our
experiments, CASANDRA’s explanations are more compre-
hensive and semantically closer to the malicious behaviors
than those of state-of-the-art approaches. Both [10] and [11]
were not demonstrated to possess this.
• Adaptiveness is another important trait of CASANDRA
which is not prevalent in any existing approach. We have
designed new experiments to thoroughly demonstrate how
CASANDRA adapts to malware population drift (see §V-D
for details). Though DroidOL [11] possessed this quality, it
was neither experimentally verified nor demonstrated.
• We also replaced the online learner used in DroidOL [11]
with a more recent state-of-the-art online learner. This
resulted in significantly better accuracies2.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows: We begin
by introducing the background and motivations for our frame-
work’s design in §II. The proposed CASANDRA framework is
presented in §III. The experimental design and implementation
details are furnished in §IV. CASANDRA’s evaluation results
and discussions are presented in section §V. Related Work,
Limitations and Conclusions are provided in §VI, §VII and
§VIII, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, the background on Android malware de-
tection and motivations for the two main components of the
CASANDRA framework, namely, CWLK and online learning
are presented. Specifically, we discuss the two following
motivations: (1) why considering structural information alone
from PRGs is insufficient to determine the maliciousness of a
sample and how supplementing it with contextual information
helps to increase the detection accuracy and (2) why using
1To the best of our knowledge, CWLK was the first graph kernel
specifically addressing a problem from the field of program analysis.
2DroidOL outperformed state-of-the-art batch-learning approaches by
nearly 20% (without retraining) and 3% (with retraining), whereas, CASAN-
DRA outperform the same by more than 25% (without retraining) and 7% (with
retraining) accuracies, respectively. We believe, this is due to the changes in
the choice of the kernel and the classifier.
batch learning is impractical for building a real-world malware
detector and how the use of online learning alleviates such
practicality issues. For the preliminaries on kernel methods
and graph kernels interested readers are referred to Appendix
A.
A. Motivations for CWLK
To demonstrate the necessity of CWLK, we use a real-world
Android malware from the Geinimi family which steals users’
private information and contrast its behavior with that of a
well-known benign app, Yahoo Weather.
Geinimi’s execution. The app is launched through a back-
ground event such as receiving a SMS or call. Once launched,
it reads the user’s personal information such as geographic
location and contacts and leaks the same to a remote server.
The (simplified) malicious code portion pertaining to the
location information leak is shown in Fig. 1 (a). The method
leak_location reads the geographic location through
getLatitude and getLongitude APIs. Subsequently,
it calls leak_info_to_url method to leak the location
details (through DataOutputStream.writeBytes) to a
specific server. The API dependency graph (ADG)3 corre-
sponding to the code snippet is shown in Fig. 1 (b). The nodes
in ADG are labeled with the sensitive APIs that they invoke
and the edges denote the control-flow dependencies.
Yahoo Weather’s execution. On the other hand, Yahoo
Weather could be launched only by user’s interaction with
the device (e.g., by clicking the app’s icon on the dash
board). The app then reads the user’s location and sends the
same to its weather server to retrieve location-specific weather
predictions. Hence, ADG portions of Yahoo Weather is same
as that of Geinimi.
Contextual information. From the explanations above, it is
clear that both the apps leak the same information in the same
fashion. However, what makes Geinimi malicious is the fact
that its leak happens without the user’s consent. In other words,
unlike Yahoo Weather, Geinimi leaks private information
through an event which is not triggered by user’s interaction.
We refer to this as a leak happening in user-unaware context.
On the same lines, we refer to Yahoo Weather’s leak as
happening in user-aware context. As explained in [14] and
[15], in the case of Android apps, one could determine whether
a PRG node is reachable under user-aware or user-unaware
context by examining its entry point nodes. Following this
procedure we add the context as an attribute to every ADG
node. This context annotated ADG of Geinimi and Yahoo
Weather are shown in Fig. 1 (c) and (d), respectively.
Requirements for effective detection. From the aforemen-
tioned example the two key requirements that make a malware
detection process effective can be identified:
(R1) Capturing structural information. Since malicious
behaviors often span across multiple nodes in PRGs, just
considering individual nodes (and their attributes) in isolation
is not enough. For instance, in the case of Geinimi, the
privacy leak attack spans across three ADG nodes. Therefore,
3The detailed procedure for constructing the ADG is provided later in
§III-B.
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1: public void leak_info_to_url (String target_url, String info_to_leak) {
2:   URL url = new URL(target_url);
3:   connection = (HttpURLConnection)url.openConnection();
4:   DataOutputStream wr = new DataOutputStream (connection.getOutputStream ());
5:   wr.writeBytes (info_to_leak);wr.flush ();wr.close ();connection.dicconnect();
6: } 
7:  public void leak_location (String target_url) {
8:    String loc = location.getLatitude() + " : " + location.getLongitude(); 
9:    leak_info_to_url (target_url, loc)}
(a) Simplified source code
(b) API Dependency Graph
getLatitude
getLongitude
writeBytes 
(c) Geinimi – Contextual API 
Dependency Graph
getLatitude
Context: {user-unaware}
getLongitude
Context: {user-unaware}
writeBytes
Context: {user-unaware}
(d) Yahoo Weather – Contextual 
API Dependency Graph
getLatitude
Context: {user-aware}
getLongitude
Context: {user-aware}
writeBytes
Context: {user-aware }
Fig. 1: Location information being leaked in Geinimi (malware) and Yahoo Weather (benign) apps. (a) code snippet corresponding to
leaking location information in both the apps. (b) ADG corresponding to the location leak. (c) Geinimi’s CADG illustrating that it leaks
information without the user’s knowledge. (d) Yahoo Weather’s CADG illustrating that it leaks information with the user’s knowledge.
capturing the structural (i.e., neighborhood) information from
PRGs is of paramount importance.
(R2) Capturing contextual information. Considering just
the structural information without the context is not enough
to determine whether a sensitive behavior is triggered with
or without users’ knowledge. For instance, if structural infor-
mation alone is considered, the features of both Geinimi and
Yahoo Weather apps become identical, thus making the latter a
false positive. Hence, it is important for the detection process
to capture the contextual information as well to make it more
accurate.
Many existing graph kernels could address the first require-
ment well. However, the second requirement which is more
domain-specific makes the problem particularly challenging.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing graph
kernels support capturing this reachability context information.
In summary, this gives us a clear motivation to develop a new
kernel that specifically addresses our two-fold requirement.
B. Motivations for using Online Learning
As foreshadowed in §I, the three main motivations for using
online learning instead of batch learning in CASANDRA are:
(1) handling population drift, (2) handling large volumes
of high dimensional data, and (3) performing detection on
data that streams-in at real-time. Malware detection-specific
justifications on how online learning helps to address these
challenges are presented below.
Handling population drift. As reported in [53], the attack
and the evasion strategies of malware have evolved signifi-
cantly, ever since the inception release of Android. Also, one
could observe the following pattern in this evolution: attacks
that were popular at some point in time could not sustain
forever. For instance, the BaseBridge family of malware
leveraged on two root exploits, namely, RATC and Zimperlich
to escalate its privileges [53]. Once the corresponding vulner-
abilities were patched and the AV vendors became capable
enough to detect such attacks, BaseBridge’s propagation and
sustenance were affected, ultimately resulting in its extinction.
This leads to the following observation: several malware
families emerge, flourish and fade-away over time due to
various domain-specific reasons.
From an ML based malware detection viewpoint, this leads
to emergence, dominance and disappearance of semantic fea-
tures that characterize these attacks and evasion strategies. This
results in the three following phenomena that happen over
time: (1) new features emerge (2) the significance of features
vary (3) the cumulative number of features keeps monoton-
ically increasing. This causes the underlying distribution of
malware samples to change over time leading to what is known
as a concept drift. As a result of this drift, the predictions of a
static model might become less accurate in due course of time.
Therefore, detectors need to adapt to such changes quickly and
accurately.
A straightforward solution to this problem is to detect the
magnitude and direction of drift in the concept over time and
retrain the batch models when the drift is significant [31].
However, this approach would be hampered if: (1) the data
arrives in large volumes at a rate too fast to detect, or (2)
retraining the models at regular intervals is too expensive.
Unfortunately, both these conditions are true in the real-world
malware detection setting, as we review in detail below. On
the other hand, online learners which are trained on a stream
of samples as they arrive are naturally adaptive to evolving
distributions mainly due to their learning mechanisms that
continuously and efficiently update the model with the most
recent examples.
Handling large high-dimensional data. Particularly in the
malware detection problem, data is large not only in sample
size, but also in feature size. For instance, on the large-scale
dataset used in our evaluation, even a light-weight method
such as DREBIN [12] extracts and uses more than 1 million
semantic features (see §V-A2). In such big data contexts, the
efficiency of a model in terms of both memory and time is of
paramount importance in determining its practicality.
However, many batch learners (e.g., SVMs, RFs) typically
take multiple passes over the training samples to optimize
their parameters and yield the most accurate models within
their hypothesis space. Often times, they are optimized to
have long and computationally expensive training phases in
order to perform accurate and faster during testing. Also, they
might require large memory as they hold a batch of samples in
memory facilitating them to take multiple passes. On the other
hand, online learners take exactly one pass over training data.
Meaning, they look at each sample that streams-in only once
and learn from them, without storing or iterating over them.
This makes the online learners highly efficient in terms of
both memory and time. Therefore, online methods offer more
practically tractable solutions for malware detection over their
batch counterparts.
Handling real-time streaming. Android has a vibrant and
growing app ecosystem with a considerable number of third-
party markets. Google Play [2], the official market, host more
than 2.4 million apps as of this writing. Meaning, nearly 1120
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new apps are submitted to Google Play, on average every day.
Also, popular third-party markets (e.g., [?]) receive a similar
number of new submissions on a daily basis.
Clearly, one important use-case of malware detection solu-
tions like CASANDRA is to deploy them to perform automated
vetting of apps submitted to these markets. Therefore, such
solutions must be scalable, always up-to-date in terms of their
knowledge on attack and evasion strategies and ready for
predicting and offering insights into apps as and when they
stream in. In other words, these model could not be trained
with an outdated set of samples and could not take outages
or downtime to retrain themselves. Unlike online methods,
the batch learners are susceptible to both these disadvantages,
making them unsuitable for handling classification over a
continuous, fast and voluminous stream of apps.
III. METHODOLOGY
The methodology of CASANDRA framework designed to
perform context-aware, scalable, adaptive and explainable
malware detection is presented in this section. We begin
by presenting the framework overview and subsequently, we
explain each component of the framework.
A. CASANDRA: Framework overview
Fig. 2 depicts CASANDRA framework’s overview. The
framework has four components as described below.
Static Analysis. Our framework considers subgraphs from
Contextual API Dependency Graphs (CADGs) as semantic
features to perform malware detection. To this end, we first
perform static program analysis to transform the given set
of apps into their corresponding CADG representations. This
procedure is explained in detail in section §III-B.
Feature Extraction & Representation. Once the CAGD of
the apps in the dataset are constructed, those subgraphs which
represent the security-sensitive events that happen in every
app along with their context are extracted as using CWLK.
We follow a Bag-of-Features (BoF) model [59] to construct
the feature vector of individual apps. The detailed procedure
is explained in §III-C.
Online Learning. Once the feature vectors of all the apps
in the training set are built, we train a CW classifier with
them to detect malware. CW classifier’s training and update
procedures are explained in detail in §III-D. Subsequent to this
training CASANDRA is ready to perform malware detection at
scale. It is important to note that the classifier is trained in an
online fashion, meaning whenever a sample is presented, the
classifier not only predicts its label but also updates the model
based on the actual label of the sample.
Explanation. ML based malware detection solutions are usu-
ally black-box methods as they do not explain why a particular
sample is detected as malicious or benign. In CASANDRA,
we address this shortcoming as follows: besides detection
CASANDRA reports significant CADG subgraphs of an app
that contribute to a detection. In most cases, these significant
subgraphs reveal the app’s characteristics related to malicious
or benign behaviors. The detailed procedure is presented in
§III-E.
B. Static Analysis
CASANDRA considers CADG subgraphs as features which
encompasses both structural and contextual information char-
acterizing security sensitive operations from apps. We perform
a comprehensive static analysis on a given app to construct its
CADG. Our static analysis and CADG construction process is
very similar to that of DroidSIFT [14] and AppContext [15].
The CADG construction workflow as depicted in Fig. 2
involves three steps. Each of them are described below.
Step 1: Inter-procedural Control Flow Graph (ICFG)
Construction. The procedure mentioned in [15] is followed
to construct the ICFG of a given app. Intuitively, the nodes
of ICFG are the instructions in every method of the app. The
ICFG edges are the intra- and inter-procedural control flows
among these instructions. There two types of interprocedural
invocations in Android apps: (1) method invocations and (2)
Inter Component Communications (ICCs). Method invocations
could be directly inferred through control flow analysis. How-
ever, ICCs are not straight forward as these invocations are
facilitated by the underlying Android OS framework. In order
to model such invocations, we leverage on the IC34 tool [38]
and perform a precise ICC analysis.
Step 2: Contextual ICFG (CICFG) Construction. During
the course of execution of the program, the ICFG nodes could
be reached by actions triggered by entities such as user or
system. Trigger events are the external events such as users’
interaction with app’s user-interface (UI) and system changes
such as receipt of SMS that trigger invocation of security-
sensitive APIs. Trigger events connect security-sensitive be-
haviors to their ”initiator” in the external environment (e.g.,
users or system). DroidSIFT [14] proposed a method to
analyze the entry point nodes (i.e., PRG nodes that do not
have any incoming edge) to identify and categorize the trigger
events into UI and NON-UI triggers. We extend this procedure
and categorize trigger events of ICFG nodes into the three
following types:
4It is noted that both DroidSIFT and AppContext used Epicc [37] for
their ICC analysis. We have replaced it with IC3 which is more recent and
state-of-the-art.
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1) UI triggers: events triggered by interactions on apps’ UI
(e.g, Clicking UI buttons to make calls, etc.).
2) NON-UI triggers: events initiated by the system state
changes (e.g., receipt of SMS, change of signal strength),
and events initiated by hardware related actions (e.g.,
pressing the HOME or BACK button).
3) UNRESOLVED triggers: Entry points of certain sensitive
methods are not traceable by our static analysis. For
instance, DroidKungFu, a popular malware family has its
malicious payload triggered by dynamically loaded code.
However, similar to [14] and [15], our static analysis
cannot model dynamic code loading and reflection based
triggers. Therefore, we consider them as behaviors with
UNRESOLVED trigger events rather than ignoring them.
Understandably, each ICFG node is triggered by one or
more of these triggers. We consider ICFG nodes that are
reachable through UI and NON-UI triggers to be in the user-
aware and user-unaware contexts, respectively. Nodes that are
reached through UNRESOLVED triggers are considered to be in
the ’unresolved’ context. The reachability context(s) of every
node is added as a node attribute. This transforms ICFG to
CICFG. To formally define CICFG, we adopt and extend the
definition of an ICFG from Harrold et al. [69] as follows.
Definition 1 (CICFG). CICFG = (Ni, Ei, ξ) of an app
a is a directed graph in which each node n ∈ Ni denotes an
instruction in every method of a, and each edge e(n1, n2) ∈
Ei denotes either an intra-procedural control-flow dependence
from n1 to n2 or a calling relationship from n1 to n2. ξ is
a set of contexts though which every node n ∈ N could be
reached.
Step 3: CADG construction. The CICFG captures the
complete control-flow across every instruction in an app, along
with context information. However, only a selected minority
of these CICFG nodes will be security-sensitive (i.e., will
invoke sensitive APIs). Therefore, once the CICFG of an app is
constructed, we abstract it to obtain CADG and narrow down
our focus only to its sensitive behaviors. Intuitively, CADG
of an app is obtained from its CICFG by considering only
the nodes that access security-sensitive APIs5 along with their
context information. All other nodes are removed and paths
that exists between such nodes in the CICFG become edges
in ADG, if they satisfy certain conditions as described below.
Definition 2 (CADG). CADG can be represented as a 4-
tuple CADG = (N,E, λ, ξ), where N is a finite set of nodes
and n ∈ N is an instruction of a method that corresponds
to invoking a security-sensitive API and therefore N ⊆ Ni.
E ⊆ N × N is a set of directed edges where an edge
from e(n1, n2) ∈ E exists iff there exists a path p(n1, n2)
between these two nodes in the CICFG and method(n1)
= method(n2), where method(n) denotes the method that
5Two existing works, namely, PScout [34] and SUSI [35] list commonly
known security-sensitive Android APIs. These two lists have been used to
perform security and malware analysis by many existing approaches such
as [15, 36, 39]. Following these studies, CASANDRA uses these two lists to
identify security-sensitive APIs.
encompasses instruction n6. λ is the set of labels representing
the security-sensitive APIs and ` : N → λ is a labeling
function which assigns a label to each node. ξ is a set of
triggers though which every node in the CADG could be
reached and C → ξ is a function which assigns the context to
each node.
A portion of Geinimi and Yahoo Weather examples’ CADGs
are shown in Fig. 1 (c) and (d), respectively. In both these apps,
all three CICFG nodes invoke security-sensitive APIs and they
are retained in CADGs. All of these nodes belong to the same
method (i.e. leak_info_to_url) and hence the path that
existed among them in CICFG translate to edges in CADG.
C. Feature Extraction & Representation using CWLK
Once the CADGs are constructed, our next task is to extract
semantic features that characterize sensitive behaviors of apps
from them. To this end, we use CWLK, a graph kernel we
developed in our previous work [10] which is specifically
designed to capture both structural and contextual information
from PRGs and perform accurate malware detection. This
directly addresses the requirements R1 and R2 stated in §II-A.
We furnish the details on how CWLK supports CASANDRA
in extracting CADG subgraph features to perform malware
detection, in this subsection. For detailed discussions on
CWLK use cases with other PRGs (e.g., ICFG), comparison
with WLK and other graph kernels, we refer the reader to
[10].
We begin by explaining the regular WLK, then introduce
the proposed CWLK and finally discuss how WLK falls short
when performing malware detection using CADGs and how
CWLK rectifies the same.
Weisfeiler-Lehman Kernel. WLK [59], works by decom-
posing graphs into subgraphs in such a way that a kernel
function for a pair of graphs can be defined as a convolution
of kernel functions defined over their subgraphs.
WLK computes the similarities between a given pair of
graphs G = (N,E, λ) and G′ = (N ′, E′, λ) based on
the 1-dimensional WL test of graph isomorphism [59]. The
algorithm works by iteratively augmenting the node labels by
the sorted set of labels of neighboring nodes. This process
is referred to as label-enrichment and new labels are referred
as neighborhood labels. Thus, in each iteration i of the WL
algorithm, for each node n ∈ N , we get a new neighborhood
label, λi(n) that encompass the ith degree neighborhood
around n. For graph G, this relabeling process yields a WL
graph at height i, denoted as Gi. Thus for any given graph G,
we could obtain a sequence of WL graphs as defined below.
Definition 3 (WL sequence). Define the WL graph at height
i of the graph G = (N,E, λ) as the graph Gi = (N,E, λi).
The sequence of graphs
G0,G1, ...,Gh = (N,E, λ0), (N,E, λ1), ..., (N,E, λh) (1)
6This follows from the observation that in most malware the malicious
code portion is closely-knit i.e., spanning only to a few methods. We also
attempted two other variants of CADG. We reduce the path in CICFG to
edges in CADG (i) only if the calling and called nodes belong to the same
package and (ii) only if the calling and called nodes belong to the same class.
Both these variants contained much larger number of edges in CAGD and
also failed to capture the attacks as effectively as the CADG defined above
(experimentally verified).
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Algorithm 1 CWLK - Contextual re-labeling
Input:
G = G0 = (N,E, λ0, ξ) — CADG with set of nodes (N ), set of
edges (E) and set of node labels (λ0) and context for each node (ξ)
h — number of iterations
Output:
{G0,G1, ...,Gh} - contextual WL sequence of height h
1: procedure CONTEXTUAL RE-LABEL(G, h)
2: for i = 0 to h do
3: for all n ∈ N do
4: σi(n)← ∅
5: if i = 0 then
6: for c ∈ ξ(n) do
7: σi(n)← σi(n) ∪ c⊕ λ0(n)
8: end for
9: else
10: N (n)← {m | (n,m) ∈ E}
11: Mi(n)← {λi−1(m) | m ∈ N (n)}
12: λi(n)← λi−1(n)⊕ sort(Mi(n))
13: for c ∈ ξ(n) do
14: σi(n)← σi(n) ∪ c⊕ λi(n)
15: end for
16: end if
17: γi(n)← string(σi(n))
18: end for
19: Gi ← (N,E, γi)
20: end for
21: return {G0,G1, ...,Gh}
22: end procedure
is called the WL sequence up to height h of G, where G0 = G
(i.e., λ0 = λ) is the original graph and G1 = r(G0) is the graph
resulting from the first relabeling, and so on.
The WL kernel over graphs G and G′ leverages on their
respective WL sequences and is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (WL kernel). Given a valid kernel k(., .) and
the WL sequence of graph of a pair of graphs G and G′, the
WL graph kernel with h iterations is defined as
k
(h)
WL(G,G
′) = k(G0,G ′0) + ...+ k(Gh,G
′
h) (2)
where h is the number of WL iterations and G0,G1, ...,Gh and
G ′0,G
′
1, ...,G
′
h are the WL sequences of G and G
′, respectively.
h is referred as height of the kernel.
Intuitively, WLK counts the common neighborhood labels in
two graphs. Hence we have k(h)WL(G,G
′) = |(λi(n), λi(n′))|,
for i ∈ {0, ..., h},∀n ∈ N, ∀n′ ∈ N ′. Clearly, this enables
WLK to capture structural information from CADGs. How-
ever, there is no scope for capturing the reachability context
information in WLK. This is exactly what we address through
our CWLK.
Contextual Weisfeiler-Lehman graph Kernel. The goal of
CWLK is to capture both structural and contextual information
from PRGs. To this end, we modify the re-labeling step of
WLK so as to accommodate the context of every neighbor-
hood. We refer to this process as contextual-relabeling and the
sequence of graphs thus obtained as contextual WL sequence.
Contextual re-labeling. Specifically, CWLK performs one
additional step in the re-labeling process which is to attach
the contexts of every node to its neighborhood label in every
iteration. This in effect, indicates the contexts under which a
particular neighborhood is reachable. The label thus obtained
is referred to as contextual neighborhood label. The contextual
Kernel Geinimi Yahoo Weather
WLK Feature
(h = 0)
{ getLatitude }
(a)
{ getLatitude }
(b)
WLKFeature
(h = 1)
{ getLatitude + writeBytes}
(c)
{ getLatitude + writeBytes}
(d)
CWLK Feature
(h = 0)
user-unaware { getLatitude }
(e)
user-aware { getLatitude }
(f)
CWLK Feature
(h = 1)
user-unaware { getLatitude + writeBytes}
(g)
user-aware { getLatitude + writeBytes }
(h)
Fig. 3: WLK and CWLK neighborhood labels for the node
getLatitude from Geinimi and Yahoo Weather apps.
relabeling process is presented in detail in Algorithm 1.
The inputs to the algorithm are CADG, G and the degree of
neighborhoods to be considered for re-labeling, h. The output
is the sequence of contextual WL graphs, {G0,G1, ...,Gh}=
{(N,E, γ0), (N,E, γ1), ..., (N,E, γh)}, where γ1, ..., γh are
constructed using the contextual relabeling procedure.
For the initial iteration i = 0, no neighborhood information
needs to be considered. Hence the contextual neighborhood
label γ0(n) for all nodes n ∈ N is obtained by justing
prefixing the contexts to the original node labels (lines 6-8,17).
For i > 0, the following procedure is used for contextual re-
labeling. Firstly, for a node n ∈ N , all of its neighboring
nodes are obtained and stored in N (n) (line 10). For each
node m ∈ N (n) the neighborhood label up to degree i − 1
is obtained and stored in multiset Mi(n) (line 11). λi−1(n),
neighborhood label of n till degree i−1 is concatenated to
the sorted value of Mi(n) to obtain the current neighborhood
label, λi(n) (line 12). Finally the current neighborhood label is
prefixed with the contexts of node n to obtain σi(n) which is
then represented as a string γi(n) which denotes the contextual
neighborhood label (lines 13-15,17-18).
Definition 5 (CWL kernel). Given a valid kernel k(., .) and
the CWL sequence of graph of a pair of graphs G and G′, the
contextual WL graph kernel with h iterations is defined as
k
(h)
CWL(G,G
′) = k(G0,G′0) + ...+ k(Gh,G′h) (3)
where h is the number of CWL iterations and G0,G1, ...,Gh
and G′0,G′1, ...,G′h are the CWL sequences of G and G′,
respectively.
Intuitively, CWLK counts the common contextual neighbor-
hood labels in two graphs. Hence we have k(h)CWL(G,G
′) =
|(γi(n), γi(n′))|, for i ∈ {0, ..., h},∀n ∈ N, ∀n′ ∈ N ′.
Illustrating WLK’s shortcoming and CWLK’s efficacy.
Having presented the formulations for both kernels, we now
illustrate WLK’s shortcomings and explain how CWLK ad-
dresses the same, with an example. Applying WLK on the
CADGs of Geinimi and Yahoo Weather examples (see Fig.
1 (c) and (d)), for the node getLatitude, for heights
h = 0, 1, we get the neighborhood labels as shown in
Fig. 3 (a)-(d). In both cases, the node getLatitude has
only one degree-1 neighbor, writeBytes and this fact is
reflected in the neighborhood label. Clearly, WLK captures
the structural information around the node getLatitude,
incrementally in every iteration of h. In fact, neighborhood
label for h = 1 captures that a sensitive node, writeBytes
lies in the neighborhood of getLatitude, which highlights
a possible privacy leak. However, WLK does not capture
whether the neighborhood involved in this leak is reached in
user-aware or unaware context. Hence, whether or not the leak
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is malicious still remains inconclusive. This is precisely what
CWLK addresses. On applying CWLK for the same node in
both apps, we obtain the contextual neighborhood labels as
shown in Fig. 3 (e)-(h). Clearly, the contextual neighborhood
labels of Geinimi reveal that the sensitive operations are
performed in the user-unaware context, whereas, the same for
Yahoo Weather happen in the user-aware context. Hence, it
is evident that the CWLK’s contextual relabeling provides a
means to clearly distinguish malicious CADG neighborhoods
from the benign ones. Therefore, unlike WLK, CWLK based
classification does not detect Yahoo Weather as a false positive.
This example clearly establishes the suitability of CWLK for
the malware detection task.
CWLK validity and complexity. CWLK’s positive defi-
niteness is asserted in Appendix B. The runtime complexity
of CWLK with h iterations on a graph with n nodes and e
edges is O(he) which is same as that of WLK. Meaning, cap-
turing contextual information in CWLK does not reduce the
efficiency. For derivation and discussion on time complexity,
see Appendix C.
Efficient computation of CWLK on K graphs. When
computing CWLK on K graphs to obtain K×K kernel matrix,
a naı¨ve approach would involve K2 comparisons, resulting
a time complexity of O(K2he). However, as mentioned in
[59], a BoF model based optimization could be performed to
compute the kernel matrix in O(Khe + K2hn) time. This
optimized computation involves the following steps: (1) A
vocabulary Σ∗ of all the contextual neighborhood labels of
nodes across the K graphs is obtained in O(Khe) time. This
facilitates representing each of the K graphs as feature vectors
of |Σ∗| dimensions. (2) Subsequently, K × K kernel matrix
can be computed by multiplying these vectors in O(K2hn)
time. In summary, CWLK has the same efficiency as WLK
yet supports richer feature vector representations which retain
CADGs’ expressiveness better.
D. Online Learning
Once the feature vectors of all the apps in the training-set are
built using CWLK, we train an online CW [47] classifier with
them to detect malware. CW classifier’s training and update
procedures are as explained below with relevant notations.
Denote the features of an app (both benign and malware)
as a vector x = [x(1), x(2), ..., x(d)]T , and its label as y ∈
{−1,+1}, where −1 indicates benign and +1 indicates mali-
cious apps. The CW classifier receives a number of samples,
xi, and their labels, yi, and trains using this labeled data. Given
a new unseen sample, x, the goal of CW classifier is to predict
the label, y, of this new sample based on its trained model.
CW classifier fits a linear decision boundary (i.e., hyper-
plane) between the positive and negative class samples. That
is, the model is a weight vector, w = [w(1), w(2), ..., w(d)]T
which indicates the weight (i.e., relative importance) of each
of the features used to predict the output label y. The predicted
label, yˆ, is the sign of the inner product between x and w:
yˆ = sign(x · w) (4)
CW incrementally builds the model in eq. (4) in rounds.
In round t, it receives a sample, xt and predicts its label yˆt
using the current model; it then receives yt, the true label
of xt and updates its model based on the sample-label pair:
(xt, yt). A Gaussian distribution over the weights with mean µ
and covariance matrix Σ is maintained by the CW algorithm.
The value µ(f) represents mean weight of feature f (i.e.,
mean of w(f)), and the value Σf,f captures the confidence
in f ’s weight. While classifying a new sample x, the weight
w is drawn from N(µ,Σ). In practice, one could choose
w = µ, the average weight vector and use eq (4) to arrive
at the predicted label. CW updates the model, (i.e., µ and Σ),
continuously on every labeled sample instead of only when
committing misclassifications. The rationale is that making
correct prediction also suggests that the model should increase
its confidence of the current weights. CW’s update rule is
presented below:
(µt+1,Σt+1) = argmin
µ,Σ
DKL(N (µ,Σ)||N (µt,Σt)), (5)
s.t.Prw∼N(µ,Σ)[yt(w · xt)] ≥ η. (6)
Eq. (5) determines that the new distribution characterized by
new Σ and µ should be close to the old distribution as much as
possible. The KL divergence (DKL) provides the measure of
distance between the two distributions. Eq. (6) determines that
the update should ensure that the probability of making correct
prediction if the same sample, xt is seen in the next round
must be bigger than η, where η is a configurable parameter
(usually set bigger than 50%). The computational complexity
of the update is linear in the number of non-zero features in
xt.
The strength of CW lies in its notion of modeling confidence
on features’ weights. Evidently, if the weight of a feature
does not fluctuate very much over time, one could confidently
believe that this weight is what it should be. CW achieves the
two following desirable characteristics through this confidence
notion, which are not exhibited by other online learners (e.g.,
Online Perceptron (OP), Passive Aggressive (PA)):
1. The weights of more confident features are updated less
aggressively. For instance, using sendSms API in the user-
unaware context is a good indicator of an app’s maliciousness;
consequently, its weight does not get updated abruptly over
time, thereby instigating high confidence on this feature.
Therefore, CW ensures that the weight will not change much
even when it receives an instance of benign app using user-
unaware{sendSms}, which possibly could be a case of
incorrect labeling. This makes CW naturally robust to labeling
noise.
2. The model is updated just enough to adapt to the changing
trends in the data while refraining from changing too much.
The rationale is that the previous model carries valuable
information about the data and should not be modified too
abruptly.
Alternatives. As practitioners involved in building an online
malware detection framework, we do not have any vested inter-
est in a particular algorithm for online learning. Ultimately, we
wish to determine the algorithm that scales well to problems of
our volume and complexity and yields the best performance.
To that end, we experimented with other well-known online
learning algorithms such as OP [44] and Stochastic Gradient
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Descent learning based Logistic Regression (LRSGD) [45] and
PA [46], along with CW. Since CW offered the best results in
terms of accuracy and efficiency, it is used in CASANDRA.
We believe this is because OP and LRSGD do not imbibe the
notion of classification confidence and treat all misclassifica-
tions equally. PA, on the other hand, updates more aggressively
when the margin of error is large and less aggressively,
otherwise. Meaning, even though PA imbibes confidence of the
classification decision, it does not account for the confidence
over individual features. This leads PA to vary the weights of
features rapidly and thereby making it susceptible to fitting to
noise. On the contrary, CW imbibes both the aforementioned
confidences and thus is robust to noise in the stream.
Online Kernel Classifiers. We experimented with online
kernel (i.e., nonlinear) classifiers such as Projectron [49] and
Forgetron [48] (with budget). Since these algorithms offered
marginal improvement in accuracy at a significantly worse
efficiency in our large-scale dataset, we chose CW to cater
CASANDRA’s online learning requirements.
Overall, as the CW algorithm makes a fine-grained dis-
tinction between each feature’s weight confidence, it can be
especially well-suited to detect malware apps since our data
stream continually introduces a dynamic mix of new and
recurring CADG subgraph features. Once the CW classifier
in CASANDRA is trained with all the samples it is ready to
perform malware detection at scale.
E. Explaining CASANDRA’s predictions
Once CASANDRA classifies a sample as malicious or be-
nign, the next step is to offer explanations of these predictions
by reporting significant CADG subgraphs of an app that
contribute to prediction. These explanations help to understand
whether the rationale behind the model’s predictions are rea-
sonable, thus ensuring users’ trust on the model. Besides, they
could help human analysts in several tasks such as studying
malware attacks and creating malware signatures.
Explaining the predictions of linear classifiers is a well-
studied problem [12, 17, 68]. Following them, we are able to
determine the contribution of each CADG subgraphs feature
to the final class prediction as described below.
Based on eq. (4) in section §III-D, for a given sample x,
during the prediction of yˆ, the largest ν weights w(s) which are
significantly important for placing the sample on the malicious
(or benign) side of the decision boundary are identified (i.e.,
a point-wise multiplication wx = w × x is performed and
ν largest values are obtained from the resulting vector wx).
Since each weight w(s) is assigned to a certain feature x(s),
it is then possible to explain why an app has been classified
as malicious (or benign). After extracting the top ν CADG
subgraph features, CASANDRA reports them explaining the
significant semantic characteristics that make a particular
sample malicious (or benign). As we could observe from our
evaluations, the frequently observed malware features include
CADG subgraphs representing the use of reflection, dynamic
and native code, accessing private information, sending of
SMS and communication over internet predominantly in the
user-unaware or unresolved context.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
We conducted several large-scale experiments to evaluate
CASANDRA’s accuracy, efficiency, adaptiveness and explain-
ability which are its primary design goals. We also compare its
performance against two accurate and efficient state-of-the-art
malware detection approaches. In this section, experimental
design aspects such as research questions (RQs) addressed,
datasets used, evaluation setup and metrics are presented along
with implementation details.
A. Research Questions
We intend to address the following RQs through our eval-
uations:
(RQ1 Accuracy) How accurate is CASANDRA in detect-
ing unseen malware from both benchmark and real-world
datasets?
The impact of the two most important factors responsible
for CASANDRA’s accuracy are investigated separately through
two following sub-RQs.
(RQ1.1) What impact does capturing contextual information
through CWLK have on CASANDRA’s accuracy?
(RQ1.2) Does CASANDRA’s online learning provide any
benefit over batch learning in terms of accuracy?
(RQ2 Efficiency) How efficient is CASANDRA over batch
learning based solutions in terms of overall training and
prediction time?
(RQ3 Explainability) How explainable are CASANDRA’s
predictions?
(RQ4 Adaptiveness) How adaptive is CASANDRA when
performing malware detection in the real-world setting? In
other words, does it adapt to malware population drift seam-
lessly?
B. Datasets
Many existing solutions such as [12, 14, 15, 39] are evalu-
ated only using benchmark datasets. We observe that malware
in benchmark datasets are much easier to detect compared to
the ones found in-the-wild (as reported in [13, 33]). Hence we
evaluate CASANDRA on both benchmark and a large collection
of recent real-world malware collected in-the-wild, so as to
exhibit its potential as a practical real-world malware detection
solution. The details of these two datasets are presented below.
Benchmark (BM) dataset. DREBIN [12] provides a popu-
lar benchmark dataset comprising 5560 malware samples be-
longing to 179 families. This dataset is used in our evaluation.
The date of creation of these apps fall in the range: from
Mar’09 to Oct’12. The DREBIN collection forms the malware
portion of the dataset and for the benign portion, we used 5000
randomly chosen benign apps from Google Play [2] that are
created in the same period.
In-the-wild (ITW) dataset. We collected a dataset of
44,347 benign and 42,910 malware apps from seven different
markets in 2014. We infer that the date of creation of these
apps fall in a span of 224 days starting from 1 Jan’14 to
13 Aug’14. Table I provides information on the distribution
of the applications in our dataset along with names of the
markets where they have been crawled from. Following the
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TABLE I: In-the-wild Dataset with apps dated from Jan. 1
2014 to Aug. 13 2014
Market # of Benign Apps # of Malware
Google Play [2] 39156 26178
Anzhi [3] 2957 12260
AppChina [4] 1845 4154
SlideMe [5] 289 132
HiApk [6] 65 157
FDroid [7] 29 2
Angeeks [8] 6 27
software security research practices proposed in [12] and [13],
we leveraged on the VirusTotal web portal7 to infer the ground
truth labels for all the apps in the ITW dataset.
C. Experimental Setup.
All the experiments were conducted on a server with 36
cores of Intel(R) Xeon CPU E5-2699 v3 @ 2.30GHz and 32
GB RAM running Ubuntu 14.04.
D. Implementation and Comparative Analysis
CASANDRA is implemented in approximately 17200 lines
of Python and Java code. IccTA [36] an Android static
analysis workbench based on Soot [9] (which encompasses
IC3 [38] for ICC analysis) is used for building CADGs from
apps. Scikit-learn [67] toolbox is used for CASANDRA’s ML
functionalities.
Comparison with state-of-the-art solutions. CASANDRA
is compared against two state-of-the-art Android malware
detection solutions, namely, DREBIN [12] and Allix et al. [13].
To this end, we re-implemented these two approaches. Since
the malware detection accuracy of these solutions predomi-
nantly depend on the features they use, we briefly introduce
them here.
DREBIN [12] is well-known for its scalable and explainable
detection. It extracts light-weight semantic features such as
APIs and permissions used, URLs accessed, names of com-
ponents from apps and subsequently, trains a linear SVM
classifier to distinguish malware from benign apps.
Allix et al. [13] recently proposed another scalable approach
using structural features, namely Control Flow Graph (CFG)
signatures. Therefore, we refer to this technique as CFG-
Signature Based Detection (CSBD) in the reminder of the
paper. CSBD constructs CFGs of individual methods and
encodes them as text-signatures. Subsequently, a RF classifier
is trained with these signatures to detect malware.
We re-implemented DREBIN and CSBD in 1400 and 900
lines (approx.) of Python code, respectively. Authenticity and
correctness of our re-implementations is verified as we observe
their accuracy and scalability values very similar to the ones
reported in the original work on similar experiments (see
§V). Besides this, re-implementations have been done in
consultation with the authors of original work.
E. Evaluation metrics.
Standard evaluation metrics such as Precision, Recall, F-
measure and cumulative error rates are used to determine the
effectiveness of malware detection. All these values are in the
range [0, 1]. High values of precision, recall and F-measure
7https://www.virustotal.com
and low values of cumulative error rate indicate accurate
detection. Efficiency is determined in terms of time required
to train and test the classifiers. Lower values of training and
testing durations indicate efficient detection.
V. EVALUATION
The evaluations, results and discussions pertaining to each
of the RQs are presented in this section.
A. RQ1: Accuracy
The results for CWLK’s and online learning’s impact on
CASANDRA’s accuracy are presented in the two following
subsections.
1) (RQ1.1) Impact of CWLK: In order to determine
whether incorporating both structural and contextual informa-
tion improves CASANDRA’s accuracy, we study the two fol-
lowing scenarios: (1) use only the structural information from
CADGs, (2) use both structural and contextual information
from CADGs to perform malware detection. Understandably,
the former scenario is realized through using WLK and the
latter is realized through CWLK. Hence in this experiment,
we compare the accuracies of these two kernels on our task.
We experimented with different kernel heights, h = 0 to 5
for CWLK and WLK (see eq. (2) and eq. (3)). The average
number of (contextual) neighborhood features are found to
increase exponentially with increasing values of h as long as
h ≤ 2. However, this number does not increase significantly
after h = 2. This is because we have removed nodes that
do not access sensitive APIs, which affects the connectivity
and restricts CADG neighborhood sizes. In other words, we
seldom have neighborhoods around nodes that span beyond
degree 2 in CADGs. Similar trend is observed in WLK. Hence
we restrict the height h to be 0, 1 and 2 for both the kernels.
Thus, in our experiments, for each kernel, we have three
malware detection models (one for each value of h).
Dataset & Experiments. The BM dataset is used in this
experiment. 70% of the samples (chosen at random) are used
to train and the remaining 30% samples are used to test the
models’ performances. The classifiers’ hyper-parameters are
determined on the training set using 5-fold cross-validation,
whereas the test set is only used for determining the final
detection performance. We repeat this procedure 5 times and
average the results. Since we wish to exclude the impact of
online learning on the models’ accuracy, we use a canonical
batch kernel classifier, namely SVM with both the kernels.
The models are referred as CWLK+SVM and WLK+SVM,
denoting the kernel and the classifier, respectively. In order
to study how CWLK features compare to state-of-the-art
solutions, DREBIN [12] and CSBD [13] are included in this
comparative analysis. The precision, recall and F-measures of
these models are compared.
Results & Discussion. These results for the 8 malware
detection models under comparison are presented in Table II.
The following inferences are drawn from the table:
• At the outset, for both CWLK and WLK, considering larger
neighborhoods helps capturing the structural information
better which in turn reflects in better performances. This is
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TABLE II: Comparison of CWLK against state-of-the-art kernel and malware detection models - avg. (± std) over 5 runs
WLK+
SVM(h=0)
WLK+
SVM(h=1)
WLK+
SVM(h=2)
CWLK+
SVM(h=0)
CWLK+
SVM(h=1)
CWLK+
SVM(h=2) DREBIN [12] CSBD [13]
P 97.11(±0.35) 98.50(±0.22) 99.21(±0.08) 98.86(±0.26) 99.07(±0.09) 99.56(±0.04) 99.01(±0.20) 98.61(±0.46)
R 95.27(±1.21) 97.11(±0.51) 98.08(±0.32) 92.79(±0.98) 97.88(±0.47) 98.90(±0.28) 99.15(±0.08) 99.13(±0.12)
F 96.18(±0.63) 97.80(±0.16) 98.64(±0.29) 95.73(±1.05) 98.47(±0.17) 99.23(±0.11) 99.08(±0.09) 98.87(±0.25)
evident as Precision, Recall and F-measure values get better
with increasing values of h for both the kernels. However,
this observation may not hold for large values of h, as nodes
that are far apart will be considered for neighborhood re-
labeling, leading to a noisy re-labeling process.
• It is clear that CWLK outperforms WLK for significant
values of h (i.e., 1 and 2), in terms of F-measure. Since
the only difference between WLK and CWLK is the latter’s
capability to capture the context information, evidently, this
is the reason for CWLK’s superior performance.
• Also, CWLK achieves better Precision than WLK for all
values of h, consistently. This indicates that CWLK suffers
lesser false positives than WLK. This reduction is a direct
result of capturing context information which helps to
precisely distinguish malicious CADG neighborhoods from
the benign ones.
• Since CWLK uses both contextual and structural informa-
tion, it is important to analyze the contribution of each of
these types of information to its performance. Capturing
only structural information is equivalent to using WLK.
Hence from columns 1 to 3 of Table II, it is evident that
structural information alone could provide a minimum of
96.18% and an average of 97.54% F-measure. Similarly, the
contribution of contextual information alone is ascertained
using CWLK and setting h = 0 to be 95.73% F-measure.
Finally, the effect of using both types of information is
ascertained by using CWLK and setting h > 0 to be a
minimum of 98.47% and an average of 98.85% F-measure.
This clearly conveys that structural information is primary
for performing effective malware detection and contextual
information complements it, thereby helping to improve the
accuracy.
• When comparing CWLK to the state-of-the-art solutions,
CWLK (with h = 2) outperforms all the compared solutions
in terms of F-measure and Precision. In particular, it outper-
forms the second best performing technique (i.e., DREBIN)
by 0.15% F-measure. In terms of Recall, it outperforms
CSBD and is comparable to DREBIN.
From the results and discussions above demonstrate
CWLK’s suitability for the malware detection problem. Hence,
we consider using CWLK in all the remaining experiments
unless mentioned otherwise.
2) (RQ1.2) Impact of Online learning: With the inference
on CWLK’s impact arrived at, we now intend to evaluate
the benefit of using online over batch learning for malware
detection.
Dataset & Experiment. In this experiment, we use the
ITW dataset as it is collected in the wild and larger, thus
offering more scope for illustrating malware population drift.
We divide the ITW dataset apps (both benign and malware)
into batches according to their date of creation. The resulting
time-line based distribution of the two datasets are presented
in Fig. 4. We have 224 batches, one for each day of the ITW
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Fig. 4: Timeline based distribution of apps in our large-scale ITW
dataset (with malware and benign apps proportions).
collection.
Specifically, in this experiment, we intend to illustrate the
benefits that CASANDRA attains due to its use of online
learning. To study this impact, we replaced the online learner
in CASANDRA with a canonical batch learner, namely, SVM
and compare the same with CASANDRA under different ex-
perimental settings (which involve periodic retraining). The
above-mentioned SVM variants use the same features as
CASANDRA and hence it is sufficient to compare online and
batch learning paradigms. Furthermore, in order to compare
CASANDRA to state-of-the-art solutions, like in the previous
RQ, we include DREBIN and CSBD (which use different set
of features) in this comparative analysis.
Batch Learning Configurations. For batch-learning solu-
tions, the classifiers are trained/retrained in a sliding window
fashion over the 224 batches as explained below. For SVM,
we experiment with the following variants: SVM-Once, SVM-
Daily, SVM-MultiOnce, and SVM-MultiDaily. For SVM-
Once, SVM classifier is trained only once on the apps from
Day 1 (1 Jan’14). This model is tested on all other days
without retaining. For SVM-Daily, the classifier is retrained
after every day; however, only one previous day’s samples
are used for every retraining — e.g., 11 Jan’14 results reflect
training on the apps created on 10 Jan’14, and testing on 11
Jan’14 apps. SVM-MultiOnce is similar to SVM-Once and
SVM-MultiDaily is similar to SVM-Daily, however, with the
size of the batch for training and retraining covers 10 days
instead of 1. In summary, for Once and MultiOnce variants,
the model is never retrained and for Daily and Multi-Daily, the
model is retrained in a sliding window fashion over the batches
of data. The size of MultiDaily training sets is determined to be
10-day batches based on the data that our evaluation machine
can handle.
CASANDRA’s online training regimen. Since CASAN-
DRA’s feature extraction using CWLK is based on BoF model,
its number of features grows as the samples stream in. Fig. 8
(in Appendix D) shows the cumulative number of features for
each day of the evaluation in ITW dataset, representing the
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Fig. 5: CASANDRA: : Cumulative error rates for CASANDRA vs. batch learning algorithms (a) CASANDRA Vs. four variants of SVM, (b)
CASANDRA Vs. four variants of DREBIN, (c) CASANDRA Vs. four variants of CSBD.
feature space growth. Each day’s total includes new features
introduced that day and all the old features from previous
days. We obtained a total of 15,171 features from the samples
encountered on Day 1 (1 Jan’14). The dimensionality grows
quickly as we extract new subgraph features from samples
encountered every day and while reaching the final day
(13 Aug’14), we have accumulated 2,114,050 features. This
phenomenon of feature space growth is common across many
techniques including DREBIN and CSBD. This is because
apps evolve over time for various reasons such as capability
enhancements, bug fixes and adapting to changes in Android
framework APIs [12, 31, 33]. This evolution results in newly
observed characteristics which translate into new features from
an ML view-point.
Now, leveraging on the inferences from our previous work
[11], we refrain from using only a subset of these features
(e.g., using only the 15,171 features encounter on Day 1).
Instead, we allow the dimensionality of our CW classifier to
grow with the number of new features encountered; on the
last day (13 Aug’14), for instance, we classify with more than
2.1 million features. Implicitly, samples that were introduced
before a feature i was first encountered will have value 0 for
feature i.
DroidOL experimentally demonstrated that the performance
for fixed feature regimen is significantly inferior to the growing
feature regimen (see §VI-C of [11]). This reveals that contin-
uous retraining with a growing feature-set allows a model to
successfully adapt to new features on a sub-day granularity.
This training regimens helps our CW classifier stay abreast of
changing trends in malware and benign apps’ features.
Results & Discussions. Figs. 5 (a), (b) and (c) shows the
cumulative error rates of CASANDRA in comparison to the
aforementioned variants of SVM, DREBIN and CSBD. The
following observations are made from the figure:
• Updating the detection models over time is essential to de-
tect new malware as shown by SVM-MultiDaily and SVM-
Daily outperforming SVM-MultiOnce and SVM-Once, re-
spectively.
• Training on significantly more data improves the per-
formance, as illustrated by SVM-MultiDaily and SVM-
MultiOnce outperforming SVM-Daily and SVM-Once, re-
spectively. However, it is noted that there is a fundamental
limit on the amount of data a batch-learning technique
could train on because of the storage, memory and time
requirements. Thus, among the SVM variants we have
considered, SVM-MultiDaily achieves the best accuracy, as
it has both the advantages of being trained frequently and
trained with large volumes of data.
• From Fig. 5 (a), one could see that CASANDRA consistently
outperforms all the batch-learning SVM variants. In partic-
ular, when the SVM models are not retrained, CASANDRA
outperforms SVM-Once and SVM-MultiOnce by more than
32% and 25%, respectively. When the SVM models are re-
trained on a daily basis, CASANDRA still outperforms SVM-
Daily and SVM-MultiDaily by more than 16% and 9%,
respectively. This is because CASANDRA is able to adapt to
the changes in the malware characteristics instantaneously
as well as retain significant useful information from the past.
• In the case of comparison with DREBIN and CSBD, the
trends in the performance of all four variants of these
methods are similar to those of the SVM variants. Hence the
observations on frequently updating the models and training
with more data, hold.
• From Fig. 5 (b) and (c), one could see CASANDRA con-
sistently outperforming the best performing variants of
state-of-the-art methods. Particularly, it outperforms Drebin-
MultiDaily by 10.61% and CSBD-MultiDaily by 7.89%.
This reaffirms the suitability of online learning solutions
over retrained batch learners for practical large-scale mal-
ware detection.
• Finally, it is worth noting that the maximum accuracies
obtained by CASANDRA and other state-of-the-art methods
on ITW dataset are much lesser than those obtained on BM
dataset. This substantiates the finding mentioned in §IV-B
that malware detection on large-scale real-world setting is
more challenging than the one with benchmark datasets.
B. RQ2: Efficiency
In this RQ, we investigate the efficiency of CASANDRA in
terms of training and testing durations. Specifically, we study
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TABLE III: Comparing CASANDRA’s efficiency against that
state-of-the-art methods in terms of training and testing
durations
Method Training Duration(avg. ± std.) in sec.
Testing Duration
(avg. ± std.) in sec.
DrebinOnce 0.0096 0.0004 (± 0.00)
DrebinMultiOnce 0.0352 0.0006 (± 0.00)
DrebinDaily 0.4493 (± 0.08) 0.0010 (± 0.00)
DrebinMultiDaily 0.5873 (± 0.27) 0.0010 (± 0.00)
CSBDOnce 0.1849 0.0354 (± 0.01)
CSBDMultiOnce 0.5858 0.0594 (± 0.03)
CSBDDaily 11.0698 (± 5.38) 0.0605 (± 0.02)
CSBDMultiDaily 14.5157 (± 11.40) 0.0641 (± 0.03)
CASANDRA 0.0131 0.0011 (± 0.00)
whether CASANDRA achieves superior accuracy at the cost of
very high (practically inviable) training or test durations.
Dataset & Experiment. The ITW dataset which involves
several thousands apps, instigating a vocabulary of over 2 mil-
lion features for CASANDRA, 1 million features for DREBIN,
offers enough opportunities to challenge these techniques in
terms of efficiency. Hence we consider ITW dataset for this
RQ. The experimental setting mentioned in RQ1.2 (§V-A2)
are reused in this RQ as well.
A typical batch learning test cycle will involve only feature
extraction, representation and prediction on each test set
sample. However, in the online learning setting the model will
predict and at the same time learn from samples that stream-in.
The initial online model is often built with a batch of trivial
number of samples and keeps updating itself from the samples
that stream-in. We emulate this scenario, as we use the batch of
samples that stream-in on the first day of ITW dataset (i.e., 1
Jan’14) to build the model. The samples that arrive thereafter
are considered as stream of samples on which CASANDRA
predicts the label and also learns from.
Results & Discussions. The training and the testing du-
rations of CASANDRA and the 4 variants of state-of-the-art
solutions across all the 224 evaluation days in the ITW dataset
are presented in Table III. In the case of batch learning models,
the training durations of variants that are retrained every day
(i.e., Daily and MultiDaily) are distributions of values (one for
each day). For the variants that are not retrained (i.e., Once
and MultiOnce) the training durations are single values, as the
training happens only once. In the case of testing durations,
each model undergoes testing cycle every day and hence this
produces a series of testing durations.
The following observations are made from Table III:
• Understandably, the batch learning variants that are trained
with smaller sets consume lesser training duration than
their counterparts trained with larger sets. For instance,
the training durations of Drebin-Once and CSBD-Once are
more than 3 times shorter than those of their respective
MultiOnce counterparts. Similar trend is observed when we
compare the variants that are retrained. That is, on average,
both Drebin-Daily and CSBD-Daily are trained 1.3 times
faster than their respective MultiDaily counterparts. This
shows that the training duration of the batch learning models
increase exponentially with the training set size. For obvious
reasons, the testing durations of Once and Daily variants
are similar to those of their Multi counterparts for both
techniques.
• It is well-known the choice of the classifier plays a pivotal in
determining the training and testing durations of the models.
Linear models like Linear SVM and CW are simpler and
could be trained much faster than quasi-linear models like
RFs. This fact is evident from our findings in the aforemen-
tioned figure. All the variants of DREBIN and CASANDRA
(which use linear models) are significantly faster than their
CSBD counterparts (which use RF classifiers) in terms of
both training and testing durations.
• Finally, we intend to compare CASANDRA’s efficiency with
those of best performing variants of the state-of-the-art
methods (i.e., Drebin-MultiDaily and CSDB-MultiDaily).
The training duration of CASANDRA is 44 and 1108 times
lesser than those of DREBIN and CSBD MultiDaily vari-
ants, respectively. This clearly illustrates that retraining
the models at specific intervals are impractical and much
less efficient than online learning in the real-world setting.
In terms of testing durations, CASANDRA is nearly 58
times faster than CSBD-MultiDaily and as fast as Drebin-
MultiDaily. In summary, on the ITW dataset, CASANDRA
takes 28.23 microseconds on average to predict the class of
a given sample.
C. RQ3: Explainablity
Apart from its detection performance the strength of
CASANDRA lies in its ability to offer interpretations of the
obtained results. We verify this quality of CASANDRA in this
RQ.
Dataset & Experiment. In this experiment, we intend to
rank the features from a given malware sample that maximally
influence CASANDRA’s classification decision and investigate
if they reflect the malicious behavior of the sample. If they do
so, we can conclude that those features explain the sample’s
behavior the best. Understandably, the ground truth on the
malware behavior could be ascertained by knowing the family
to which it belongs. For instance, a sample belonging to the
FakeInstaller family is expected to send premium-rated SMS
as this behavior is a part of its attack vector. Therefore, clearly,
the availability of malware family labels is indispensable
for this experiment. Out of our two datasets, only the BM
dataset contains malware family labels. Hence in this RQ,
we experiment with three popular malware families from the
BM dataset and analyze how CASANDRA features with high
weights allow conclusions to be drawn about their behavior.
As in the previous RQs, we intend to compare the explain-
ability of CASANDRA with that of DREBIN and CSBD. In
terms of classifiers used, it is noted that results of DREBIN
(which uses linear SVM) and CSBD (which uses RF) are
perfectly interpretable. However, the features used by each of
these methods are also different and have different levels of in-
terpretability. As mentioned in the original work [12], a signif-
icant feature reported by DREBIN for the FakeInstaller family
is the use of permission SEND_SMS. This is highly correlated
to the main functionality of the malware. However, for the
same family, CSBD, as it considers CFG signatures as features,
reports the signature F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0P1G as
the most significant feature (see §4.1 of [13] for details on
extracting CFG signature features). This feature is neither hu-
manly interpretable nor correlated to FakeInstaller’s malicious
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Fig. 6: CASANDRA Vs. DREBIN: Comparing explainability
on three popular families from the BM dataset
functionality. This clearly illustrates that CSBD’s results are
inexplicable. Hence, we refrain from including CSBD in this
RQ’s comparative analysis.
Results & Discussion. To study the most significant fea-
tures that influence the predictions of the CASANDRA and
DREBIN, we consider three well-known malware families,
namely FakeInstaller, GingerMaster and DroidKungFu from
the BM dataset. For each sample of these families we de-
termine the features with the highest contribution to the
classification decision and average the results over all members
of a family. The resulting top five features for each malware
family for both the techniques are shown in Fig. 6.
From the figures the following inferences are drawn for each
family:
FakeInstaller malware samples send premium-rated SMS
to specific numbers without users’ consent. It is evident that
features identified by CASANDRA not only highlight neighbor-
hoods with operations related to SMS, but also reflect that they
are triggered predominantly in the user-unaware or unresolved
context. These operations include getting the default SMS
manager, sending normal and multi-part SMS. Also, from the
third top feature, one could see that FakeInstaller triggers these
operations using AlarmManager APIs which are invoked
in the background without the users’ knowledge. On the
other hand, DREBIN’s explanations are simpler and naive. For
instance, as DREBIN claims simply sending SMS does not
make an app malicious. However, doing the same without
the users’ consent does. This distinction is not evident from
DREBIN’s explanations.
DroidKungFu is a sophisticated command-and-control
(C&C) based family of malware capable of exploiting several
vulnerabilities in earlier version of Android to gain root access
and steal sensitive data from the device. Its intention to leak a
variety of private information such as unique identifiers (e.g.,
IMEI, IMSI) and contents from content provider (e.g., con-
tacts) to the C&C server over internet is adequately revealed
by CASANDRA’s features. Also, this malware reads system
state changes such as SIG_STR through respective intents
and use them to trigger malicious services in the background.
Again, compared to DREBIN, CASANDRA’s explanations are
closer and more descriptive of the secretive operations of
DroidKungFu. Interestingly, the fact that DroidKungFu lever-
ages on Java reflection to obfuscate its attack is evident from
CASANDRA’s explanations.
Ginmaster is a popular Trojan family that involves in leak-
ing users’ private information to remote C&C servers, besides
attempting to gain root access. Similar to DroidKungFu, Gin-
master performs its leaks through services that are triggered by
background events such as BOOT_COMPLETED. Also, these
malware use reflection (through java.lang.Class APIs)
to obfuscate their attacks. Again, a significant part of this
behavior can be better reconstructed just by looking at the
top features of CASANDRA.
D. RQ4: Adaptiveness
In this RQ, we intend to study how CASANDRA adapts
itself to malware evolution and population drift. Specifically,
we intend to explore how online learning helps CASANDRA
to learn fresh patterns and unlearn obsolete patterns of ma-
licious behavior over time. As stated earlier, all the existing
Android malware detection approaches (incl. DREBIN [12] and
CSBD [13]) are based on batch learning and are not capable
of adapting themselves to population drift. Adaptiveness is
CASANDRA’s unique feature and hence we could not compare
this with any existing technique. Hence, we just illustrate how
CASANDRA achieves adaptiveness in this subsection.
Dataset & Experiment. In this RQ we prefer the BM
dataset for three reasons: (1) it hosts malware collection over
a longer period which is ideal to study malware evolution
(2) its heterogeneity – it contains malware with attacks as
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Fig. 7: Illustration of how CASANDRA adapts to the malware evolution and population drift in the BM dataset. The X axis shows the
distribution of family-specific malware samples. Y axis (left) shows the number of samples and Y axis (right) shows the weights of
individual features. The legend contains CWLK subgraph features (format: <feature id>: <context> {<root-node> + <neighbor-list>})
simple as sending premium-rated SMS to complex botnets,
(3) availability of accurate malware family labels.
In this experiment, the apps in BM dataset are sorted
according to their month of creation. We observe that several
malware families in this dataset emerge, flourish and fade-
away over time due to various domain-specific reasons. For
example, DroidKungFu family first emerged in May’11 and
reached its peak spread during Sep-Oct’11 and gradually
disappeared by May’12.
Any good malware detector must adapt to such evolution.
To examine whether CASANDRA exhibits this adaptiveness,
we train it in an online fashion on the BM dataset following
a procedure similar to RQ1.2 (§V-A2). The training and
prediction quantum changes from days in RQ1.2 to months
in this RQ.
Once the prediction and learning for all the samples in a
month m is over, we record the weights of all the features.
Since BM dataset hosts malware collection over 44 months,
the weights of each feature are recorded at 44 points in
time. This gives us an opportunity to monitor and track the
fluctuations in the importances of individual features over time.
In general, features that characterize typical malicious and
benign behaviors will be assigned large positive and negative
weights, respectively. Features that do not reveal anything
about malice or benignity will be assigned near-zero weights.
For a detector that adapts well to the evolving trend in
malware population, the feature weights should follow the
pattern of population drift. More specifically, when a particular
family of malware F gains prominence over a period, say from
month m to m′, the weights of features that characterize the
attacks and evasion strategies of F should increase or remain
high. Once the samples from family F start to dwindle, the
weights of those features should decrease or remain low.
Results & Discussion. In order to study this behavior,
we chose three malware families that perform privacy leak
attacks, namely, DroidKungFu, Ginmaster, and ADRD. The
behaviors of DroidKungFu and Ginmaster are explained in the
previous RQ. ADRD also secretively leaks users’ private data
in a similar fashion. As shown in Fig. 7, in the BM dataset,
ADRD first emerged in May’10 and gained prominence from
Oct’10 to Dec’10. It finally vanished from Mar’11. A very
small number of ADRD samples resurfaced in Jun’11, Nov’11,
and Jul’12. The evolution of DroidKungFu and Ginmaster
populations could be inferred in a similar fashion from Fig. 7.
Now, leveraging on CASANDRA’s explainability, we choose
10 features that best explain the privacy leaks from these
families and study fluctuations in their weights over time.
These fluctuations are also shown in Fig. 7.
One could clearly see that the feature weight fluctuations
follow the evolution of the corresponding families. For in-
stance, from Mar’09 to Apr’10 many of these features had no
significant positive weights as none of these populous privacy
leak families emerged. Some features had near-zero weights
indicating that they do not characterize any malice at that
point in time. After May’10, a small number of features that
characterize ADRD start to gain positive weights. After the
voluminous influx of DroidKungFu in May’11, almost all the
features started to gain larger positive weights. In particular,
one could see the following interesting patterns:
• Feature f2 typically characterizes the ADRD family. The
weights of this feature surge rapidly during ADRD’s peak
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spread period (i.e.,Oct-Dec’10).
• Features related to reflection (i.e., f4 and f8) and inferring
installed apps (i.e., f3 and f9) are common for both Droid-
KungFu and Ginmaster. These features receive significant
increase in their weights once DroidKungFu emerges in
Jun’11. Even after DroidKungFu vanishes, these features
continue to accumulate more weights as Ginmaster samples
keep streaming till Sep’12.
• The weights of features that characterize common malicious
behaviors across many families such as URL features (i.e.,
f1 and f10) remain predominantly high throughout the entire
duration.
• Similar subgraph features exhibit very close or exactly
same weight fluctuation patterns. For instance, the two
PackageManager features (i.e.,f3 and f9) and two URL
features (i.e., f1 and f10) have exactly same pattern over
the entire duration. This reflects the fact that these features
characterize either same or very similar attacks.
• Finally, when we reach the end of the dataset collection
period in Sep’12, we could see CASANDRA has assigned
large positive weights to all the 10 features. Meaning, it has
learned that all of them characterize malicious behaviors.
In particular, CASANDRA has learnt that features such as
reflection and PackageManager APIs (f3 and f9)
characterize stronger malicious behaviors than other features
such as reading device ID (f5), which may be common in
benign apps as well. This is reflected from the fact that it
has assigned larger positive weights to the former set of
features than the latter.
In summary, we could clearly see that CASANDRA when
trained in an online fashion, adapted well to the population
drift and evolution in malware. So far, none of the existing
techniques (incl. DREBIN and CSBD) demonstrated this ca-
pability. We believe adaptiveness is the cornerstone for the
practical success of ML based malware detector.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Android Malware Detection
Many well-known malware detection solutions have been
reviewed in the previous sections. We throw light on remaining
works and contrast them from CASANDRA in this subsection.
Features used for detection is the most important aspect of
ML based malware detectors. Hence, we discuss the related
work with respect to this aspect.
Crowdroid [40] leverages on dynamic analysis and uses
Linux system-call sequences as features. DroidAPIMiner [23]
considers a hand-crafted set of sensitive APIs (along with their
parameters) and package level information as features. MAST
[22] uses selected permissions, Intent filters, the existence
of native code and zip files, then applies Multiple Corre-
spondence Analysis to perform malware detection. Peiravian
et al. [24] take a simpler approach by considering permis-
sions and API calls as features. CHABADA [25] leverages
on text-mining techniques to study the relevance between
apps’ behavior and their description and henceforth detect
suspiciously behaving apps. Sahs and Khan [21] extract a
variety of features including permissions and CFG signatures
and perform early-fusion of those features. With these fea-
tures, they take an anomaly detection approach using a One-
Class Support Vector Machine to detect malware. ADAGIO
[17] constructs apps’ call-graphs (CGs) and uses byte-code
instructions to assign labels to nodes. Subsequently, it captures
structural information from CGs using NHGK and uses kernel
SVM to detect malice. DroidMiner [16] proposes a two-
tiered behavior graph to model malicious program logic into
a vector of threat modalities, and then applies classification
according to these modalities. MassVet statically analyzes
apps’ UI code to extract a graph that expresses the UI state and
transitions. Subsequently, it uses a centroid-based approach to
detect repackaged apps and DiffCom analysis to identify the
malicious portions of those apps.
Recently, several techniques such as MARVIN [26], HADM
[27] and StormDroid [28] adopt a hybrid approach by combin-
ing both static and dynamic analysis features and demonstrated
achieving better accuracies than solutions leveraging on one
of the analysis paradigms.
However, all these solutions are based on batch-learning and
they neither account for concept drift in Android malware nor
exhibit adaptiveness. On the contrary, CASANDRA uses online
learning and is naturally adaptive to concept drift. More-
over, none of the above-mentioned techniques exhibit all the
four qualities that CASANDRA possess (i.e., accurate context-
aware detection, efficiency, explainability and adaptiveness).
The only other work that discusses concept drift in Android
malware is Prescience [31]. It detects drifts in malware concept
using Venn-Abers predictors and retrains the computationally
heavy models such as XGBoot and ExtraTrees periodically.
Though, this retraining approach addresses concept drift, as
we showed in §V-B it is significantly less efficient than using
online learning.
B. Graph Kernels
Several general purpose graph kernels have been proposed
and used in many real-world applications. These graphs ker-
nels can be categorized into four major families:
1. Graph kernels based on walks/paths. Random Walk (RW)
[55] and Shortest Path (SP) [57] graph kernels are classic
examples of this family. The RW kernel counts the number
of common walks when simultaneous walks are performed on
a pair of graphs. The SP kernel simply compares the sorted
endpoints and the length of shortest-paths that are common
between two graphs. A significant bottleneck for both these
kernels is their computational cost. The best known time
complexity for exact computation is O(n3) for both RW and
SP kernels.
2. Graph kernels based on subgraphs. The graphlet [58] and
Neighborhood Subgraph Pairwise Distance kernel (NSPDK)
[61] are popular instances of this family. Graphlet kernel
counts the common non-isomorphic subgraphs (upto a certain
degree) among a pair of graphs to evaluate their similarity
and is computable in polynomial time. NSPDK counts the
number of rooted subgraphs containing nodes up to a certain
distance from the root, the roots of which are located at a
certain distance from each other, in two graphs.
3. Graph kernels based on subtree patterns. WLK is the
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most popular instance of this family. Since we have explained
it extensively in several sections, we refrain from discussing
it here.
4. Deep Graph Kernels. Recently, the success of deep repre-
sentation learning techniques in other fields like Natural Lan-
guage Processing inspire researchers to learn representations
of sub-structures from graph and thus develop deep learning
variants of popular graph kernels. For instance, Yanardag and
Vishwanathan [64] develop deep learning variants of many of
the above-mentioned kernels such as graphlet, SP and WLK.
Similarly, Narayanan et al. [65] learn latent representations of
rooted subgraphs and thus develop a deep learning variant of
WLK.
Considering the malware detection application, while all
these general purpose kernels could capture and compare
structural data well, they fail to capture reachability contexts
as it is a strong application-specific requirement. CWLK is
specifically designed to address this research gap.
Application-specific graph kernels. Like CWLK, several
application-specific kernels have been proposed in the past.
For instance, Harchaoui and Bach [63] propose a segmentation
kernel that counts common virtual sub-structures amongst
images to perform Computer Vision tasks such as image
classification. Mahe et al. [62] propose a marginalized graph
kernel for a chemoinformatics application where they enrich
the node labels using the Morgan index and counted the
number of matching nodes across graphs. Driven by similar
motivation, we have developed CWLK to cater specifically to
malware detection. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first graph kernel specifically addressing a problem from the
field of program analysis.
VII. LIMITATIONS
Static Analysis Limitations. The previous evaluation demon-
strates the efficacy of our method in detecting recent mal-
ware on the Android platform. However, CASANDRA, can-
not generally detect all sorts of malicious behaviors, as it
builds on concepts of static analysis and lacks dynamic in-
spection. In particular, transformation attacks that are non-
detectable by static analysis (e.g., attacks based on re-
flection and bytecode encryption could go undetected). To
alleviate the absence of a dynamic analysis, CASANDRA
extracts API calls related to obfuscation, reflection, and
loading of code, such as reflect.Constructor and
DexClassLoader.loadClass. These features enable us
to at least spot the execution of hidden code—even if we
cannot further analyze it. In combinations with other features,
CASANDRA is still able to identify malicious behaviors despite
the use of some obfuscation techniques.
Adversarial attacks. Another limitation which follows from
the use of ML is the possibility of attacks by adversaries
such as poisoning (see [51, 70]). While common obfuscation
strategies, such as identifier renaming and code reordering do
not affect CASANDRA, adversaries may succeed in reducing
its accuracy by incorporating benign CADG subgraph features
or fake invariants into malicious apps. When attackers succeed
in tampering online learning methods and make them adapt to
carefully crafted noise, the damages caused are much worse
compared to batch learners as they may continuously fit to
noise allowing malware to go undetected. Even though such
adversarial attacks against ML based detectors cannot be ruled
out in general, meticulous sanitization of training data (see
[51]) can limit their impact.
VIII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present CASANDRA, an online learning
based Android malware detection framework. CWLK, a novel
graph kernel that facilitates capturing apps’ security-sensitive
behaviors along with their context information from depen-
dency graphs is also proposed. CWLK supports explicit feature
vector representation of apps’ dependency graphs using which
an online classifier is trained to detect malware. Our large-
scale evaluations on both recent real-world and benchmark
datasets demonstrate that CASANDRA outperforms two state-
of-the-art techniques. CASANDRA achieves 89.92% accuracy
on a real-world dataset with more than 87,000 apps out-
performing state-of-the-art techniques by more than 25% in
their typical batch-learning setting. On average, CASANDRA
takes 28.23 microseconds to predict the label of a given
sample in our large-scale experiment, which is comparable
to state-of-the-art techniques, making it scalable enough to
perform market-scale analysis. This superior performance and
scalability make CASANDRA, in particular, and online learning
based solutions, in general, better candidates for the malware
detection task.
Future Work. Taking into account the recent developments
in the area of Deep Graph Kernels (e.g., [64, 65]), which show
potentials to learn latent sub-structures from graphs to achieve
better accuracy, we intend to explore on the deep learning
variant of CWLK in our future work.
APPENDIX A
PRIMER ON KERNEL METHODS & GRAPH KERNELS
Kernel methods have been highly successful in solving a
specific class of problems where feature vector representations
of samples are not readily obtainable. Malware detection
using PRGs is one of such problems. For many well-known
classifiers, the data samples have to be explicitly represented
as feature vectors through a user-specified feature map φ. In
contrast, kernel methods require only a user-specified kernel k,
i.e., a similarity function over pairs of samples in their native
representations. Kernel methods work by mapping the samples
into a feature space, implicitly and finding an appropriate
decision boundary in the new feature space. Here, feature
map φ(·) is realized through the kernel function k, which
facilitates computing inner products in the feature space using
the samples in their native representation, i.e. k(xi, xj) =
〈φ(xi), φ(xj)〉.
Graph Kernels. Formally, a graph kernel k : G×G→ R
is a kernel function defined on a domain of graphs, G. Hence,
given a labeled graph dataset Dg = (g1, y1), ..., (gn, yn) and a
graph kernel k, a kernel classifier (e.g. SVM) can be directly
used to perform graph classification. Graph kernels usually
belong to the family of R convolution kernels. These kernels
decompose graphs into sub-structures such as paths, walks etc.
The comparison of two graphs is then based on the similarity
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between all pairs of such sub-structures. Several graph kernels
have been proposed based on this idea [55]–[57, 59]–[61].
Explicit vs. Implicit Feature mapping. Existing graph
kernels can be classified into approaches that use explicit
feature mapping (φ) and those that directly compute a kernel
function (i.e., φ is not necessarily known and may be of infinite
dimension). Examples of former category include WLK [59]
and NHGK [60], and that of latter category are RW [55] and
SP [57] kernels. Kernels that support explicit feature mapping
have two advantages that make them particularly suitable for
the malware detection problem:
(1) Scalability. If explicit representations are manageable,
these approaches usually outperform other kernels regarding
runtime on large datasets, since the number of vector repre-
sentations scales linear with the dataset size.
(2) Explainability. These kernels support extracting sub-
structures of graphs as features and building a vocabulary
of such features. This facilitates building explicit feature
vector representation of individual graphs. This aspect makes
this category of kernels amenable for performing explainable
malware detection.
Two explicit feature mapping kernels, namely, WLK [59]
and NHGK [60] have been successfully used for Android
malware detection in [21] and [17] respectively. Moreover,
[17] performed explainable detection leveraging on the explicit
feature map produced by NHGK.
APPENDIX B
CWLK POSITIVE SEMI-DEFINITENESS
Theorem 1. CWLK is positive definite.
Proof. Let us define a mapping φ that counts the occurrences
of a particular contextual neighborhood label sequence γ in
G (generated in h iterations of Algorithm 1). Let φ(h)γ (G)
denote the number of occurrences of γ in G, and analogously
φ
(h)
γ (G′) for G′. Then,
k(h)γ (G,G
′) = φ(h)γ (G), φ
(h)
γ (G
′) = |{(γi(n), γi(n′))|
γi(n) = γi(n
′), i ∈ {0, ..., h}, n ∈ N,n′ ∈ N ′}| (7)
Summing over all γ from the vocabulary Σ∗, we get
k
(h)
CWL(G,G
′) =
∑
γ∈Σ∗
k(h)γ (G,G
′) =
∑
γ∈Σ∗
φ(h)γ (G)φ
(h)
γ (G
′)
= |{(γi(n), γi(n′))|γi(n) = γi(n′), i ∈ {0, ..., h}, n ∈ N,n′ ∈ N ′}|
(8)
In general, k(h)CWL defines a kernel with corresponding feature
map φ(h)CWL, such that
φ
(h)
CWL = (φ
(h)
γ (G))γ∈Σ∗ (9)
For proof of validity of CWLK with compression on con-
textual neighborhood labels using a function f : Σ∗ → Σ such
that f(γi(n)) = f(γi(n′)), iff γi(n) = γi(n′) could be found
in §IV of [10].
APPENDIX C
CWLK TIME COMPLEXITY
The runtime complexity of CWLK with h iterations on
a graph with n nodes and e edges is O(he) (assuming
e > n) which is same as that of WLK. More specifically,
the neighborhood label computation with sorting operations
(lines 10-12 of Algorithm 1) take O(e) time for one iteration
and the same for h iterations take O(he). The inclusion of
context (lines 6-8,13-15), does not incur additional overhead
as e>n. Hence the final time complexity remains as O(he).
For a detailed derivation and analysis of the time complexity
of WLK, we refer the reader to [59].
APPENDIX D
FEATURE SPACE GROWTH
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Fig. 8: Cumulative number of features observed over time
for our ITW dataset.
REFERENCES
[1] Symantec 2016 Threat Report. https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/
symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-2016-en.pdf
[2] Google Play. https://play.google.com/store
[3] Anzhi third-party market. www.anzhi.com
[4] AppChina third-party market. www.appchina.com
[5] SlideMe third-party market. www.SlideME.org
[6] HiApk third-party market. www.hiapk.com
[7] FDroid third-party market. www.fdroid.org
[8] Angeeks third-party market. http://apk.angeeks.com
[9] Soot framework. http://sable.github.io/soot
[10] Narayanan, Annamalai, et al. ”Contextual Weisfeiler-Lehman Graph
Kernel For Malware Detection.” The 2016 International Joint Conference
on Neural Networks (IJCNN). IEEE, 2016.
[11] Narayanan, Annamalai, et al. ”Adaptive and Scalable Android Malware
Detection through Online Learning.” The 2016 International Joint Con-
ference on Neural Networks (IJCNN). IEEE, 2016.
[12] Arp, Daniel, et al. ”Drebin: Effective and explainable detection of
android malware in your pocket.” Proceedings of the Annual Symposium
on Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS). 2014.
[13] Allix, Kevin, et al. ”Empirical assessment of machine learning-based
malware detectors for Android.” Empirical Software Engineering (2014):
1-29.
[14] Zhang, Mu, et al. ”Semantics-aware Android malware classification
using weighted contextual API dependency graphs.” Proceedings of the
2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. ACM, 2014.
[15] Yang, Wei, et al. ”Appcontext: Differentiating malicious and benign mo-
bile app behaviors using context.” Proc. of the International Conference
on Software Engineering (ICSE). 2015.
[16] Yang, Chao, et al. ”Droidminer: Automated mining and characterization
of fine-grained malicious behaviors in android applications.” Computer
Security-ESORICS 2014. Springer International Publishing, 2014. 163-
182.
[17] Gascon, Hugo, et al. ”Structural detection of android malware using
embedded call graphs.” Proceedings of the 2013 ACM workshop on
Artificial intelligence and security. ACM, 2013.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 11, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2012 19
[18] Chen, Kai, et al. ”Finding unknown malice in 10 seconds: Mass
vetting for new threats at the google-play scale.” 24th USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX Security 15). 2015.
[19] Peng, Wei, et al. ”ACTS: Extracting Android App Topological Signature
through Graphlet Sampling.”
[20] Martinelli, Fabio, et al. ”Classifying android malware through subgraph
mining.” Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Secu-
rity. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. 268-283.
[21] Sahs, Justin, and Latifur Khan. ”A machine learning approach to android
malware detection.” Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference
(EISIC), 2012 European. IEEE, 2012.
[22] Chakradeo, Saurabh, et al. ”Mast: triage for market-scale mobile mal-
ware analysis.” Proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on Security
and privacy in wireless and mobile networks. ACM, 2013.
[23] Aafer, Yousra et al. ”DroidAPIMiner: Mining API-level features for
robust malware detection in android.” International Conference on Se-
curity and Privacy in Communication Systems. Springer International
Publishing, 2013.
[24] Peiravian, Naser, and Xingquan Zhu. ”Machine learning for android
malware detection using permission and api calls.” 2013 IEEE 25th
International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence. IEEE,
2013.
[25] Gorla, Alessandra, et al. ”Checking app behavior against app descrip-
tions.” Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Software
Engineering. ACM, 2014.
[26] Lindorfer, Martina, et al. ”Marvin: Efficient and comprehensive mo-
bile app classification through static and dynamic analysis.” Computer
Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC), 2015 IEEE 39th
Annual. Vol. 2. IEEE, 2015.
[27] Xu, Lifan, et al. ”HADM: Hybrid Analysis for Detection of Malware.”
[28] Chen, Sen, et al. ”StormDroid: A Streaminglized Machine Learning-
Based System for Detecting Android Malware.” Proceedings of the 11th
ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
ACM, 2016.
[29] Dash, Santanu Kumar, et al. ”DroidScribe: Classifying Android Malware
Based on Runtime Behavior.” Mobile Security Technologies (MoST 2016)
7148 (2016): 1-12.
[30] Suarez-Tangil, Guillermo, et al. ”DroidSieve: Fast and Accurate Classi-
fication of Obfuscated Android Malware.” (2016).
[31] Deo, Amit, et al. ”Prescience: Probabilistic Guidance on the Retraining
Conundrum for Malware Detection” Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
workshop on Artificial intelligence and security. ACM, 2016.
[32] Xu, Meng, et al. ”Toward Engineering a Secure Android Ecosystem: A
Survey of Existing Techniques.” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 49.2
(2016): 38.
[33] Roy, Sankardas, et al. ”Experimental study with real-world data for
Android app security analysis using machine learning.” Proceedings of the
31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. ACM, 2015.
[34] Au, Kathy Wain Yee, et al. ”Pscout: analyzing the android permission
specification.” Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer
and communications security. ACM, 2012.
[35] Arzt, Steven, et al. ”Susi: A tool for the fully automated classification
and categorization of android sources and sinks.” In 2014 Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS).
[36] Li, Li, et al. ”Iccta: Detecting inter-component privacy leaks in android
apps.” Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Software
Engineering-Volume 1. IEEE Press, 2015.
[37] Octeau, Damien, et al. ”Effective inter-component communication map-
ping in android: An essential step towards holistic security analysis.”
Presented as part of the 22nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 13). 2013.
[38] Octeau, Damien, et al. ”Composite constant propagation: Application
to android inter-component communication analysis.” Proceedings of the
37th International Conference on Software Engineering-Volume 1. IEEE
Press, 2015.
[39] Avdiienko, Vitalii, et al. ”Mining apps for abnormal usage of sensitive
data.” Software Engineering (ICSE), 2015 IEEE/ACM 37th IEEE Inter-
national Conference on. Vol. 1. IEEE, 2015.
[40] Burguera, Iker, et al. ”Crowdroid: behavior-based malware detection
system for android.” Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security
and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices. ACM, 2011.
[41] Fredrikson, Matt, et al. ”Synthesizing near-optimal malware specifica-
tions from suspicious behaviors.” Security and Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE
Symposium on. IEEE, 2010.
[42] Blum, Avrim. On-line algorithms in machine learning. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 1998.
[43] Ma, Justin, et al. ”Identifying suspicious URLs: an application of large-
scale online learning.” Proceedings of the 26th Annual International
Conference on Machine Learning. ACM, 2009.
[44] Rosenblatt, Frank. ”The perceptron: a probabilistic model for informa-
tion storage and organization in the brain.” Psychological review 65.6
(1958): 386.
[45] Zhang, Tong. ”Solving large scale linear prediction problems using
stochastic gradient descent algorithms.” Proceedings of the twenty-first
international conference on Machine learning. ACM, 2004.
[46] Crammer, Koby, et al. ”Online passive-aggressive algorithms.” The
Journal of Machine Learning Research 7 (2006): 551-585.
[47] Dredze, Mark, et al. ”Confidence-weighted linear classification.” Pro-
ceedings of the 25th international conference on Machine learning. ACM,
2008.
[48] Dekel, Ofer, et al. ”The Forgetron: A kernel-based perceptron on a fixed
budget.” Advances in neural information processing systems. 2005.
[49] Orabona, Francesco, et al. ”The projectron: a bounded kernel-based
perceptron.” Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Machine
learning. ACM, 2008.
[50] Singh, Anshuman, et al. ”Tracking concept drift in malware families.”
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Security and artificial intelli-
gence. ACM, 2012.
[51] Kantchelian, Alex, et al. ”Approaches to adversarial drift.” Proceedings
of the 2013 ACM workshop on Artificial intelligence and security. ACM,
2013.
[52] Masud, Mohammad M., et al. ”Cloud-based malware detection for
evolving data streams.” ACM Transactions on Management Information
Systems (TMIS) 2.3 (2011): 16.
[53] Zhou, Yajin, and Xuxian Jiang. ”Dissecting android malware: Character-
ization and evolution.” Security and Privacy (SP), 2012 IEEE Symposium
on. IEEE, 2012.
[54] Vishwanathan, S. V N., et al. ”Graph kernels.” Journal of Machine
Learning Research 11.Apr (2010): 1201-1242.
[55] Ga¨rtner, Thomas, et al. ”On graph kernels: Hardness results and efficient
alternatives.” Learning Theory and Kernel Machines. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2003. 129-143.
[56] Kang, U., et al. ”Fast Random Walk Graph Kernel.” SDM. 2012.
[57] Borgwardt, Karsten M., and Hans-Peter Kriegel. ”Shortest-path ker-
nels on graphs.” Fifth IEEE International Conference on Data Mining
(ICDM’05). IEEE, 2005.
[58] Shervashidze, Nino, et al. ”Efficient graphlet kernels for large graph
comparison.” AISTATS. Vol. 5. 2009.
[59] Shervashidze, Nino, et al. ”Weisfeiler-lehman graph kernels.” The Jour-
nal of Machine Learning Research 12 (2011): 2539-2561.
[60] Hido, Shohei, and Hisashi Kashima. ”A linear-time graph kernel.” Data
Mining, 2009. ICDM’09. Ninth IEEE International Conference on. IEEE,
2009.
[61] Costa, Fabrizio, and Kurt De Grave. ”Fast neighborhood subgraph pair-
wise distance kernel.” Proceedings of the 26th International Conference
on Machine Learning. Omnipress, 2010.
[62] Mahe´, Pierre, et al. ”Extensions of marginalized graph kernels.” Pro-
ceedings of the twenty-first international conference on Machine learning.
ACM, 2004.
[63] Harchaoui, Za¨id, and Francis Bach. ”Image classification with segmen-
tation graph kernels.” Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2007.
CVPR’07. IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2007.
[64] P. Yanardag and S. Vishwanathan. ”Deep graph kernels.” In Proc. of
SIGKDD, 2015.
[65] Narayanan, Annamalai, et al. ”subgraph2vec: Learning distributed rep-
resentations of rooted sub-graphs from large graphs.” In Workshop on
Mining and Learning with Graphs, 2016.
[66] Friedman, Jerome, Trevor Hastie, and Robert Tibshirani. The elements
of statistical learning. Vol. 1. Springer, Berlin: Springer series in statistics,
2001.
[67] Pedregosa, Fabian, et al. ”Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python.”
Journal of Machine Learning Research 12.Oct (2011): 2825-2830.
[68] Ribeiro, M. T., et al. ”Why Should I Trust You?”: Explaining the
Predictions of Any Classifier. In Proc. of SIGKDD, 2016.
[69] Harrold, M. J., et al. ”Computation of interprocedural control depen-
dence.” In ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes (Vol. 23, No. 2,
pp. 11-20).
[70] Biggio, Battista, et al. ”Poisoning behavioral malware clustering.” Pro-
ceedings of the 2014 Workshop on Artificial Intelligent and Security
Workshop. ACM, 2014.
